Story of Stuff

I just learned about the video "Story of Stuff", and I highly recommend it! Check it out at www.storyofstuff.com . There you'll also find other useful information about the stuff we consume.

Global Warming Swindle: Really???

Letter to the IPCC

Everybody is welcome to sign the below statement by sending a mail with your name, position, and institutional affiliation to roser@ethik.uzh.ch by Wednesdy, 1st of April.

The letter together with the signatures will then be handed over to the IPCC.


Ethical Expertise for AR5



It is widely acknowledged…

…that ethical questions play a central role in climate science and policy. Most recently, this is evidenced in the key messages resulting from the International Scientific Congress on Climate Change in Copenhagen of March 2009.[1] IPCC reports are full of explicit and implicit references to ethical issues, particularly in the context of discussions on sustainability. Important examples include:

- global distributive justice in mitigation and adaptation[2]

- intergenerational justice, in particular the issue of discounting[3]

- usefulness of cost-benefit analysis in evaluating climate change[4]

- the relation of humans to nature and questions regarding the value of biodiversity and natural services[5]

- value judgements that determine what is to count as a "key" vulnerability and what level of anthropogenic interference with the climate system is to count as "dangerous"[6]



We observe…

…that in the IPCC assessment reports, ethical questions are not addressed with the same rigour as other questions. The analysis of issues with strong ethical components is not conducted on a comparable level of scientific quality as is the analysis of other issues.

It is indicative of this general observation that, for the references given for the examples above, there is an almost complete lack of professional ethicists among the coordinating, lead, and contributing authors.



We observe…

…that by now there is a large and growing literature on climate change written by ethics specialists. The first survey article on climate ethics appeared in the most prominent ethics journal five years ago,[7] and bibliographies with relevant literature take up many pages.[8]



We therefore suggest…

…that a chapter with a general overview of the ethical issues in climate change be included in AR5. Such a chapter should not arrive at specific conclusions regarding the morally "correct" climate policy, but should rather provide an analysis that can support political decision-making and facilitate structured discussion. It should enumerate the approaches available in the state of the art literature as well as portray the most relevant arguments concerning all sides of the debate. Above all, authorities in the field of ethics rather than social or natural scientists should prepare such a chapter.
In case a chapter on ethical issues should not become a reality, we urge that, at the very least, in those chapters where ethical issues are expressly addressed, the expertise of professionals in the field of ethics is sought and that such professionals be included in the list of authors.




[1] See in particular key message 4 at http://climatecongress.ku.dk/newsroom/congress_key_messages/

[2] For example: AR4, WG III, chap. 13, especially 13.1.2; AR4, WG III, chap. 2.6 (for an earlier example, see: TAR, WG III, chap. 10.4.5)

[3] For example: AR4, WG III, chap. 2.4.2.1. (for an earlier example, see: SAR, WG III, chap. 4)

[4] For example: AR4, WG III, chap. 2.2 – 2.4 (for an earlier example, see: TAR, WG II, chap. 2.7).

[5] For example: AR4, WG III, chap. 2.6.3; AR4, WG II, 19.3.2.

[6] For example: AR4, WG II, chap. 19.1.2.2; AR4, WG III, chap. 1.2.2

[7] Gardiner, S. (2004). “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114: 555 – 600.

[8] An impression can be gained from http://rockethics.psu.edu/climate/education/bibliography.shtml
Among the many contributions by specialists in the field of normative science, salient examples of state of the art treatments include:

- Caney, S., Gardiner, S., Jamieson, D. & Shue, S. (eds.) (2009). Climate Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press).

- Page, E. (2006). Climate Change, Justice and Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).

- Vanderheiden, S. (2008). Atmospheric Justice. A Political Theory of Climate Justice (New York: Oxford University Press).

"Back to the Roots" or "Flight Forward"?

When I was a child, we considered a certain saying very funny: “Teachers help us to solve the problems we wouldn’t have without them”. Can we say the same thing about technological progress, economic growth and climate change: “Technological progress and economic growth have provided us with the greenhouse problem but they will also be the ones enabling us to solve it”?

There are basically two strategies to solve the greenhouse problem: The first strategy (The “back to the roots strategy”) advises the human race to consume less, to halt and reverse economic growth and to adopt a lifestyle of sufficiency. The idea is to decrease production which (given that emissions per unit of production do not increase) decreases overall emissions.
The second strategy (the “flight forward strategy”) puts all its money on the horse of economic growth and technological progress. The idea is not to decrease production but to decrease emissions per unit of production and thereby to decrease overall emissions. In addition, economic growth and technological progress might also decrease the atmospheric emission concentration through coming up with better ways to build up up sinks, carbon sequestration, and new ways of geo-engineering; and also, importantly, by increasing adaptive capacity.

The most important problem with the first strategy (“back to the roots”) is that it is not “realistic”. The most important problem with the second strategy (“flight forward”) is that it is anything but certain that technological progress will be able to solve the greenhouse problem.
What about the objection to the first strategy of “not being realistic”? A lot of interesting points could be made about this objection using the resources of the exciting research in moral philosophy on non-ideal theory (non-ideal can mean several things, for example non-ideal epistemic conditions or – and this is the relevant case here – non-ideal compliance and motivation of the actors involved).

But I think from the perspective of an individual which (i) is willing to do whatever it takes to solve the greenhouse problem and (ii) has to decide on which policies to support, a lot of the huge and intricate discussion on the pros and cons of the two strategies and a lot of the discussion on non-ideal theory boils down to estimating four probabilities:

1. P1: The probability of convincing humanity to implement the first strategy
2. P2: The probability of the first strategy being successful if implemented
3. P3: The probability of convincing humanity to implement the second strategy
   
4. P4: The probability of the second strategy being successful if implemented

Then, in order to decide on whether to follow the first or second strategy (and simplifying incredibly), we have to check whether:

P1 x P2 smaller than P3 x P4

or whether

P1 x P2 larger than P3 x P4.

It is my hope that this sounds in some way trivial. It was my intention to extract the core of this huge and intricate discussion between the two strategies of “back to the roots” and “flight forward”.

It seems to me that in current debates there is a lot of focus on probability P4. Authors and commentators (rightly) point out that if we put our stakes on economic growth we are making a gigantic and very uncertain bet which could very well go dead wrong: the chances that technological progress will solve the greenhouse problem are far far below 100%. And so, a lot of people stress that P4 is much smaller than P2, i.e. it would be the much safer strategy to mitigate radically by abandoning the path of ever-increasing consumption and materialism.
It seems to me, however, that much too little focus is laid on P1, i.e. the chances of convincing humanity to commit itself to an anti-growth strategy. These chances are in my eyes so incredibly minuscule that they outweigh everything else in the equation. Just think of how much the most advanced economies groan and moan if in a certain year their economies do not grow or imagine how they wail and whine if their economies even shrink in a given year. Then imagine shrinking their economies every year not only by negligible amounts but by, say, 50% over the coming decades. And, further, imagine not only demanding something of this sort of affluent societies but of poor societies, too. The probability of convincing humanity of this strategy is incredibly small. And therefore, it does not seem wise to put much effort into policies pursuing the first strategy. (Side remark: This is not say that individuals are not under a duty to pursue the first strategy in their own lifes).

I have left incredibly much out of the simplified picture (for example that there are other considerations – such as that the first strategy is the more “natural” one – or that the decision between the two strategies is not an either-or-decision). My only goal was to break the whole big discussion down to a stylized problem. This was mainly my goal in order to point out that the discussion should shift from P4 to P1.

Merry Christmas :)

A bit old, but if somebody shouldn't have seen it, here's something on the lighter side:

Externalities on future generations?!

It is often said that the GHG emissions of the present generation have negative externalities for future generations, or also, that they involve costs for future generations. That is: While the present generation reaps the benefits associated with emissions, it externalizes the costs of these emissions to the future.

I want to argue that there is something problematic about the idea of "externalities" or "costs" to future generations. I assume that the concepts of "cost" and "externality" are understood in the sense that an action of A counts as imposing an externality/cost on B in case B is made worse off than it would otherwise be, i.e. had the action not occurred. So, if A listens to loud music this imposes an externality/cost on B because B is made worse off than if A had not listened to loud music. In such simple cases, it is clear which two situations are compared: The baseline case is the situation where A does not listen to loud music and the deviating case which is said to involve costs/externalities is the situation where A does listen to loud music. A's not acting (i.e. not listening to loud music) is the case relative to which we compare other cases and which helps us separate costs from benefits (or, respectively, negative from positive externalities).

The problem in the intergenerational case is that we do not have an obvious baseline scenario which would allow us to separate positive from negative externalities (or, respectively, costs from benefits). If someone claimed that global emissions of 30 billion tons involve negative externalities on future generations, we can always ask: Relative to what baseline is the future generation made worse off by these 30 billion tons? And why is this the obvious baseline? Would you count global emissions of 5 billion tons or of 0 billion tons (or of -2 billion tons) as positive externalities or would you still count them as negative externalities?
Similarly, we can ask how much the present generation has to save for those savings to count as a positive externality. Does any addition to what the present generation has inherited from past generations count as a positive externality? And, if so, why? Why should zero savings be the natural baseline relative to which saving more counts as a positive externality and saving less counts as a negative externality?

In the non-intergenerational case, we are in possession of an obvious baseline: "Not listening to music" - or more generally: not doing something, not affecting the world, leaving the world as it is, in its status quo position. In the intergenerational case, we are not in possession of some "status quo" of future generations (associated with not acting on our part, i.e. not affecting future generations) relative to which we could count worsenings as costs and improvements as benefits.

So, there is something problematic about the claim that GHG emissions involve externalities or costs for future generations.

(P.S.: Some more things would have to be said, e.g.: (i) that I left the Non-Identity Problem out of the picture or (ii) that in some cases context makes it obvious what counts as the baseline or (iii) that there actually is at least one salient baseline: the baseline of what we owe to future generations).

Are Historical Emissions Harmful? Postscript

And then, there is of course a fourth reason why it is debatable whether historical emissions count as harmful: The Non-Identity-Problem.

The Problem in a nutshell is this: If in 1970 a people decided to pursue a policy of rapid economic growth which at the same time has a big impact on climate, this decision not only worsens the condition of persons living in 2070 but it also influences the whole course of history, including which persons exist at all in 2070. A given person in 2070 who would not exist but for the policy chosen in 1970 cannot claim to be worse off had a greener policy been pursued in 1970 because with such a policy the person would not be better off but rather not exist at all.

Quite a mindboggling problem.

A lot of the solution turns on, roughly, whether one can understand "harm" in other ways than "making worse off". For a discussion, see Lukas Meyer's entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on intergenerational justice.